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A Multidimensional Look at the Gender
Crisis in the Correctional System
Marya P. McDonald*
In 1977, Mary Glover led fellow female inmates at Michigan's
Huron Valley Women's Facility in comparable educational, voca-
tional and employment programs to those available to male in-
mates of Michigan's correctional system.1 After being denied such
services by the prison administration, Glover sought the assistance
of the courts.2 Unlike other courts,3 however, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan helped the fe-
male inmates by ordering the prison to follow a remedial plan to
correct the disparate provision of services. 4 Unfortunately, the
court order itself has not yet been enough to successfully get the
prison administration to provide the services in accordance with
the guidelines set by the court.5
* J.D. expected 1998, University of Minnesota; B.A. 1995, Marquette Univer-
sity. I would like to thank everyone on Law & Inequality who contributed to this
Note, especially Amy Hennen, Jill Moeller and Abby Nesbitt. I offer my sincere
gratitude to Prof. Jim Chen and to Dr. Thomas McDonald, my father, for their pro-
fessional insights and comments in the areas of administrative law and criminol-
ogy, respectively. Finally, I want to thank my parents and my brother for their
support as I worked on this Note and throughout my life. You have taught me
that by working together we find success, and that by staying together we find
happiness. Mom and Dad, your support and encouragement has always been an
inspiration to me. Thank you for being wonderful parents, for loving me for who I
am and for becoming my very dear friends.
1. See Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1076 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
2. See id. at 1075 (finding defendants in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the provision of educational,
apprenticeship and vocational programming).
3. See, e.g., Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (holding male
and female inmates are not similarly situated); linger v. Department of Correc-
tions, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994) (same).
4. See Glover v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 808, 851-52 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
5. See Glover v. Johnson, 879 F. Supp. 752, 759-60 (E.D. Mich. 1995). While
recognizing that the prison officials had made "significant improvements in a
number of areas," the court held that they had not "substantially complied" with
the court ordered remedial plans. Id. Additionally, the court acknowledged that
"[i]t may be indigenous to the nature of this litigation that it is seemingly endless,"
id. at 753, but it asserted that the court's involvement would end when there was
"substantial compliance" with the goals of a consent judgment or negotiated set-
tlement. Id. at 760.
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The problem with the Michigan prison was not necessarily
that the administrators wanted to deny equal services to women,
but rather that they were unable to do so within the confines of the
prison's traditional regulatory framework. The struggle within the
walls of Michigan's Huron Valley Women's Facility is similar to
the historical struggle of prisons in the United States to keep up
with evolving societal norms. 6 Prisons must balance the limited
constitutional rights of inmates7 against the reality that internal
security is the primary concern of prisons.8
Historically, security concerns, combined with social, cultural
and economic considerations, 9 have had a significant impact on the
development of the United States correctional system and specifi-
cally on the treatment of female inmates. 10 While some problems
within prisons were solved by separating inmates by gender,"
questions still persist concerning the degree of limitation on con-
6. See infra Part I.A (explaining the history of changes in the correctional system).
7. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) ("Lawful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges or rights, a
retraction justified by the considerations underlying our system."); see also Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979) (upholding restrictions on the rights of pre-
trial detainees). While inmates retain some of their constitutional rights, these
rights are subject to restraint and limitations due to the legitimate goals and poli-
cies of the penal institution. Id. at 546 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's
Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977)). 'There must be a 'mutual accommodation
between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution
that are of general application."' Id.
8. See Women in Prison: Programs and Alternatives. Hearings on S. 1158 Be-
fore the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 63 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement by Elaine A. Lord, superintendent of Bedford Hills Correctional Facil-
ity). It is a "simple reality" that security is the primary function in correctional
facilities. Id. The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that "central
to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security
within the corrections facilities themselves." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823
(1974). Additionally, when a given restriction infringes on an inmate's constitu-
tional rights in the name of furthering security, courts balance the infringement
on rights against the institutional security requirement before deciding whether to
uphold the practice. Bell, 441 U.S. at 547. This balancing results in tradeoffs
within the correctional system.
9. Prison security demands a majority of the available funding. Hearings,
supra note 8, at 63. Thus, rehabilitative programs in prisons operate around secu-
rity requirements. Id.
10. See LARRY E. SULLIVAN, THE PRISON REFORM MOVEMENT: FORLORN HOPE
6 (1990); Nicole Hahn Rafter, Equality or Difference, FED. PRISONS J., Spring 1992,
at 17, 17. Prisons created very promiscuous conditions by housing men and
women in the same compartments or cells through the early nineteenth century.
SULLIVAN, supra, at 6; see also Rafter, supra, at 17. Starting with one Philadel-
phia jail in 1790, institutions began to segregate female and male inmates.
SULLIVAN, supra, at 6.
11. Separating men and women improved prison privacy, decreased isolation of
female inmates and decreased the vulnerability of the women to sexual exploita-
tion. Rafter, supra note 10, at 17.
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stitutional rights and about the tradeoffs the system should
make. 12 Female inmates have invoked the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 3 as well as Title IX14 of the
Educational Amendments of 1972 in their continuing efforts to al-
leviate some of these disparities. 15 While these challenges to the
correctional system have yielded inconsistent results,16 it is clear that
the system has not yet developed a remedial paradigm to the problems
and that a practical and effective remedy remains to be conceived.17
12. As early as the middle of the nineteenth century when prisons were as-
signing female inmates to a separate area within the prison, the tradeoffs of gen-
der separation began to emerge. Id. Primarily, as institutions housed women far-
ther from the central part of the institution, the "less access they had to whatever
opportunities were available to the male convicts, such as medical advice and
services, religious services, and opportunities to exercise in the yard." Id. Because
the separate women's units did not have kitchens, the prison staff had to bring
food to the women from the men's quarters, but they commonly did that only once
a day. Id. Additionally, female inmates did not have supervision to protect them
from each other. Id.
Many legal challenges against correctional agencies focus on the different pro-
grams and services offered to male and female inmates and claim the institutional
choices, or tradeoffs, violate the civil rights of female inmates. See, e.g., Pargo v.
Elliott, 69 F.3d 280 (8th Cir. 1995) (raising claims that services provided to fe-
males are inferior to those available to male inmates); Batton v. State, 501 F.
Supp. 1173 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (same).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
14. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-
88 (1997)). Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 focuses solely on gender
discrimination in that it provides that "[nlo person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1997).
15. See, e.g., Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1228 (9th Cir. 1994) (utilizing
Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause to raise a gender discrimination claim
with respect to programming offered to male and female inmates); Klinger v. De-
partment of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994) (challenging the provision of
programs and services to female inmates under the Equal Protection Clause);
West v. Department of Corrections, 847 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Va. 1994) (challenging
denial of participation by females in a male only Boot Camp Incarceration Pro-
gram under the Equal Protection Clause); Batton, 501 F. Supp. 1173 (raising an
equal protection claim based on differences between the work release, vocational
training and other rehabilitative programs offered to male and female convicts).
16. Compare Pargo, 69 F.3d 280 (upholding the legality of prison programming
despite many identifiable differences between those offered for men and those for
women) with Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (holding dis-
parities in services provided to male and female inmates violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and that the inmates were similarly situated) and Klinger, 31 F.3d
727 (holding male and female inmates are not similarly situated for purposes of
prison programming).
17. See Stefanie Fleischer Seldin, A Strategy for Advocacy on Behalf of Women
Offenders, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 10 (1995); see also, e.g., Glover v. Johnson,
879 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (ruling that prison officials were not in sub-
stantial compliance with a remedial plan designed to correct an equal protection
1997]
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This Note takes a multidimensional look at the constitutional
problem of gender discrimination facing the correctional system
and at the equally serious problem of the legal system's failure to
find and implement an effective remedy for the constitutional vio-
lation. Part I examines the modern correctional system by re-
viewing the history of changes that led to the development of the
system in the United States. Part II looks at administrative law
and the tools that are available to courts when reviewing an action
by a governmental agency, such as the federal or state department
of corrections. Finally, Part III asserts that to resolve the current
constitutional problems in the correctional system, the legal com-
munity must utilize administrative law practices and tools. Appli-
cation of these tools will reveal the three dimensions of the current
problem: the nature of the administrative hearing, the type of
administrative procedure and the rights at issue. These aspects,
in illustration, form three dimensions of an administrative cube.
Type of Procedure





The cubical paradigm illustrates the procedural structure be-
hind administrative agencies while identifying systemic problems
in the correctional system that function together to create gender
inequality. After locating the current system within the cube, this
Note will identify why the current structure creates problems. The
judiciary, along with the legislative and executive branches, can
redirect the correctional system within the three-dimensional
model by using the tools of administrative law to find a permanent
solution to gender discrimination in the system.
violation of the rights of female inmates in a class action suit which began in 1977).
[Vol. 15:505
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I. The United States Correctional System
A. The History of Corrections in the United States
The prison system in the United States has developed as a re-
flection of social, political, economic and cultural changes in soci-
ety. Interestingly, however, society has not required the prison
system to keep up with some of the legal changes that have oc-
curred.18 In the 1900s, as the United States became increasingly
segregated, the prison system did the same by segregating male
and female inmates. 19 Since then, this separation by gender has
become an accepted characteristic of the modern correctional system.20
Female inmates have historically received inferior services
compared to those provided to male inmates.21 First, very few of
the female correctional facilities nationwide have vocational
training programs, and in general there is a limited number of
work programs for female offenders. 22 Second, the services that
18. Despite the fact that society has attempted to eliminate the separation of
people based on an immutable, identifiable characteristic, the gender segregation
of prisoners has continued and is accepted. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting the separation of school children based on their race)
with Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding a Board of Corrections
regulation which was a prima facie case of gender discrimination because being
male was a bona fide occupational qualification).
19. See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 6. The segregation of male and female in-
mates first occurred with the opening of the Walnut Street Jail in 1790. Id. Soci-
ety viewed this facial gender separation as a "great advance." Id. Sing Sing be-
came the first women's prison with rehabilitative services in 1844, and, although it
had a short life, it marked a progreesive change in women's corrections. Id. at 15.
20. See Christine M. Safarik, Constitutional Law--Separate But Equal: Jeld-
ness v. Pearce-An Analysis of Title IX Within the Confines of Correctional Facili-
ties, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 337, 337 (1996); see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 326
(acknowledging and accepting the gender separation of prisons); Jeldness, 30 F.3d
at 1228 (accepting prison separation by gender due to security needs).
21. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 10; see, e.g., Klinger, 31 F.3d at 729
(claiming women's programs in prison are inferior to those for men); Pargo, 69
F.3d at 281 (explaining female inmates' claim of inferior services). See generally
SULLIVAN, supra note 10 (tracing the inadequate services provided to women
throughout the history of America's correctional system). Traditionally, female
inmates have had unequal educational programs, including "facilities, programs,
services and industrial training opportunities" in comparison to male inmates.
Hearings, supra note 8, at 10. Unfortunately, this programming inequity contin-
ues today. See AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, THE FEMALE OFFENDER: WHAT
DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 21 (1990) [hereinafter ACA STUDY].
22. See ACA STUDY, supra note 21, at 21; see also Beverly R. Fletcher &
Dreama G. Moon, Introduction, in WOMEN PRISONERS: A FORGOTTEN POPULATION
5, 12 (Beverly R. Fletcher et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter WOMEN PRISONERS]. See
generally Rosemary Herbert, Women's Prisons: An Equal Protection Evaluation, 94




the system does provide to female inmates are problematic in that
the vocational training programs for women "provide skills that
are not in demand in the outside job market and do not provide a
livable wage."23  Third, the correctional services reflect gender
stereotypes; work programs are often limited to "domestic work,
hairdressing, typing, sewing and nurse's aide work."24 Moreover,
women's correctional institutions often have inadequate health
and medical care, pay women less than men for the performance of
the same jobs and use more tranquilizers and psychotropic medi-
cations as a means of control. 25
Explanations for these differences in services focus on the na-
ture of the female inmate population. Some claim that the rela-
tively small female prison population2 6 makes the cost of providing
better services prohibitive. 27 Others claim that the correctional
23. Fletcher & Moon, supra note 22, at 13.
24. Id. (citations omitted); see Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1085 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) (identifying the plaintiffb argument that the vocational programs for
women in the prison only prepare them for menial positions that are stereotypical
for women); Klinger, 31 F.3d at 736 (McMillian, J., dissenting) (identifying that
that programs for female inmates are limited to domestic work). While male in-
mates have access to vocational programs in which they could "train to be carpen-
ters, electricians and machine operators, women [inmates] are often restricted to
work assignment or classes in sewing, cosmetology, cleaning or food preparation."
Hearings, supra note 8, at 11. One study revealed that these gender stereotypes
exist with respect to program goals as well:
[Tihe primary goal of programs for female prisoners is often teaching
"femininity"-how to walk, talk, and carry themselves. This is related
both to the view that female offenders have "failed" as women and must
be retrained for the role; and the view that the only hope for women pris-
oners is marriage.
Fletcher & Moon, supra note 22, at 13 (quoting R.R. ROSS & E.A. FABINO, FEMALE
OFFENDERS: CORRECTIONAL AFTERTHOUGHTS 29 (1986)).
Notably, this problem of stereotyping women in prisons is not unique to the
United States. In England, for example, the Prison Department explained in 1973
that female prisoners should be returned to society as "efficient 'housewives' and
to do so the system stressed that education programs for female inmates should
cover "personal relationships, family life, home management, child rearing and
other domestic topics."' PAT CARLEN, ALTERNATIVES TO WOMEN'S IMPRISONMENT
19 (1990) (quoting R. Brown, The Education of Women in Prison, in PRISON
EDUCATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES (W. Forster ed., 1982)).
25. Fletcher & Moon, supra note 22, at 12.
26. See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 14 (explaining that in the mid-1800s
women were a small proportion of the overall convict population in the United
States). See also Hearings, supra note 8, at 64 (statement by Elaine A. Lord of the
Bedford Hills Correctional Facility) (stating that men have been over-represented
in prisons in the U.S. for many years). In 1992, there were 833,184 men incarcer-
ated in United States prisons and jails whereas there were only 50,409 women.
Hearings, supra note 8, at 12.
27. See Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1085; Fletcher & Moon, supra note 22, at 12.
The explanation for this rationale is that the low number of female inmates makes
the programming costs higher on a per capita basis. Proponents of this argument
[Vol. 15:505510
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system does not have a strong incentive to spend money to reha-
bilitate female prisoners because they are not as dangerous to so-
ciety as their male counterparts. 28 Finally, the system considers
female prisoners to be less demanding than men because they are
less likely to riot over inadequate prison conditions. 29
While there are differences in the services available for male
and female prisoners, the services that are offered within the cor-
rectional system have adapted with society. Specifically, the reha-
bilitative and punitive aspects of the system have fluctuated as a
reflection of the changing sociological and political climates of the
day.30 The 1950s were the Era of Treatment in American correc-
tional facilities, 31 and the period marked a rise in the movement to
rehabilitate prisoners.32 Reality, however, turned this rehabilita-
tive optimism to skepticism as crime rates continued to increase,
and the penology perspective had to adjust as the civil rights
movement influenced prisoners. 33 As a result, in the 1960s, the
correctional system focused on "curing 34 inmates through commu-
maintain it is "fiscal reality that providing for a wide range of programs for a
smaller number of prisoners entails a greater cost." Bukhari v. Hutton, 487 F.
Supp. 1162, 1172 (E.D. Va. 1980).
28. See Fletcher & Moon, supra note 22, at 12. Female offenders commit more
economic crimes than violent crimes. Hearings, supra note 8, at 12. See generally
infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text (describing the female inmate population
and the crimes that female inmates have committed). Additionally, male inmates are
"more likely to be violent and predatory than female inmates." Klinger, 31 F.3d at 731.
29. See Fletcher & Moon, supra note 22, at 12.
30. See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 61.
31. See id.; cf. FRANK SCHMALLEGER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE TODAY 445-48 (4th ed.
1997) (identifying 1945-1967 as the Era of Treatment in corrections).
32. See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 61. The focus of the penal system during
that period was on treating and correcting inmates rather than simply on punish-
ing them. Id. The American Prison Association marked this systemic redirection
by changing its name to the American Correctional Association. Id.
The medical model of treatment emerged and gained popularity during this
era. SCHMALLEGER, supra note 31, at 447. This approach emphasized "mandatory
treatment, indeterminate sentences, and rehabilitation." FED. BUREAU OF
PRISONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JuSTIcE ANNUAL REPORT 1990, at 7 [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT]. However, the medical model and the treatment approach were
widely unsuccessful due in part to understaffing of programs and questionable di-
agnosis methods. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 65. Furthermore, inmates knew
that the primary objectives of prisons remained the same; specifically, the aim of the
system was "to lock up the convict" and to protect the public. Id. at 66-67. This pur-
pose endured all of the orientation changes in the correctional system. See id.
33. See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 76. "The women's movement of the late
1960's ... renewed demands for equal treatment of male and female inmates. The
tide began to turn against domestic training. Instead, advocates insisted on pro-
grams that would prepare released women for real-world jobs and self-support."
Rafter, supra note 10, at 18-19.
34. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 77.
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nity-oriented treatment.35 This perspective gained support in the
1970s. 36 A change in the attitudes of prisoners, who became
somewhat unified against correctional officials, also marked the
decade and led to future systemic changes.3 7 The 1980s witnessed
a decline in the use of community-based corrections as social con-
sensus regarding prisons reverted to classical notions of punish-
ment.38 A theory of just deserts developed in the correctional sys-
tem. 39 This perspective continues today.40
As the correctional system moved toward rehabilitation and
community based corrections in the 1960s and 1970s, prisoners be-
came more politically and legally astute. Inmates raised questions
regarding fair process and the rights of offenders within the sys-
tem. 41 These challenges shook the system. Since the beginning of
the United States penitentiary system, courts had essentially ig-
nored lawsuits against correctional facilities and their officials be-
cause of a lack of judicial expertise and separation of powers con-
cerns. 42 Additionally, judges used social control theories to explain
that judicial interference with the decisions of prison administra-
35. Id. at 83. It was during this era of resocialization that programs such as
work release, parole and probation developed with fervor. Id. at 83-86. In 1965,
the enactment of the Prison Rehabilitation Act officially authorized halfway
houses, furloughs and work release programs while putting the Federal Bureau of
Prisons in the center of penology. Id. at 86.
36. See id. at 112; SCHMALLEGER, supra note 31, at 448 (identifying 1967-1980
as the era of the community-based format in corrections).
37. See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 99. As a result, there were many riots in
prisons throughout the nation as the inmates demanded improved living condi-
tions, health care and food. Id. at 95-106.
38. See id. at 114.
39. See id. at 122; see also ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 7 (describing the
1980s as the "nothing works" era in which the correctional system minimized re-
habilitation and emphasized the notion of just deserts); SCHMALLEGER, supra note
31, at 450 (explaining that the just deserts model is based on the belief that of-
fenders "should get what's coming to them"). Congress enacted the 1984 Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act, which created the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 125. The Commission asserted that the
"rehabilitation of a criminal was of secondary importance to protecting the public
and that sentences should reflect the seriousness of the crime committed." Id.
40. The era of increased punishment and just deserts theory, which meant
more prisoners were in prison and for longer periods of time, see SULLIVAN, supra
note 10, at 128, still marks the present correctional system. SCHMALLEGER, supra
note 31, at 453.
41. See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 91-92.
42. See id. at 92. But see FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FORUM ON ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS, LONG-TERM CONFINEMENT AND THE AGING
INMATE POPULATION 94 (1990) [hereinafter FORUM] (explaining the paradox facing
the modern correctional system of "having very inexperienced staff managing in-




tors "would undermine discipline and cause hazardous conditions
for staff and convicts alike."43 As a result of inmates' legitimate
constitutional questions, starting in the early 1960s and continu-
ing in the 1970s, courts began to hear such cases and often ruled
in favor of prisoners.44 Inmates used this new political and legal
power to defy prison authority45 and to change the nature of prison
revolts,46 after which prison administrators were often forced to
acknowledge that there were problems within the system.47 In re-
sponse to this acknowledgement, the penal system moved away
from the treatment approach and refocused on custody as its pri-
mary objective. 48
Despite the judicial system's apparent change in its response
to prisoner lawsuits in the 1960s and 1970s, the strong judicial
deference to prison administrations has continued. 49 In 1979, the
43. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 92.
44. See id.; see, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (permitting lawyers
to provide legal advice to prisoners who could not afford to hire lawyers for their
cases); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (allowing prisoners to sue state officials
in federal court for the first time); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 806 (1961) (enabling
blacks to bring suit on constitutional grounds directly in federal courts).
45. See Charles H. Jones, Recent Trends in Corrections and Prisoners' Rights
Law, in CORRECTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 119, 123 (Clayton A. Hartjen & Ed-
ward E. Rhine eds., 1992) (explaining that the inmates of the 1960s and 1970s
"were no longer content to merely serve time" and that now they "sought to par-
ticipate in the decision-making processes" of prisons).
46. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, prison gangs began to form as inmates
organized themselves based on ethnicity and race. MATTHEW SILBERMAN, A
WORLD OF VIOLENCE: CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 119 (1995). These inmate sub-
groups existed in opposition to other inmate groups rather than just opposing the
prison administration. Id. With this change in the prison culture, inmate on in-
mate violence increased in frequency, which added another element of danger to
prisons not only during riots but also in daily life. Id. at 120. As a result of these
changes, there was a major race-instigated riot at San Quentin in 1967, as well as
39 riots in 1969 and 59 in 1970. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 93.
47. See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 93-94, 111. In 1971, as a result of prisoner
activism and criticism from reformers, the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals admitted that the "system was too arbitrary
and discretionary" after the conviction stage of the criminal process. Id. at 111.
The Commission further acknowledged that the "American judicial system was
inadequate and adversely affected the correctional system." Id. at 112.
48. See id. at 93. This change from the "era of 'everything works' to the era of
'nothing works" occurred very quickly, and now research reaffirming the value of
rehabilitative programs for criminal offenders has challenged the degree of the
change. Edward E. Rhine, Sentencing Reform and Correctional Policy: Some Unan-
swered Questions, in CORRECTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 45, at 271, 280.
49. The judicial deference continued only in some situations. When the First
or Eighth Amendments were at issue, for example, courts have intervened and re-
quired prisons to change their policies to protect the constitutional rights of in-
mates. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (affirming that an official
prison policy violates the Eighth Amendment if it led to extreme cruelties); Ruiz v.
Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that the Texas correctional system
1997]
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United States Supreme Court asserted that "[p]rison administra-
tors.., should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security."50 Furthermore, the Court has stated that
judicial deference is necessary under the separation of powers doc-
trine because prison administration is the responsibility of the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches. 51
In granting this high degree of deference, the Court also ac-
knowledged the need to protect the constitutional rights of in-
mates. 52 When reviewing a claim that prison policies infringe on
the constitutional rights of inmates, a court may only inquire
whether the regulation is "reasonably related to legitimate pe-
nological interests."53 If the regulation is reasonably related, then
violated the Eighth Amendment). See generally SILBERMAN, supra note 46, at 110-
16 (discussing the demise of the hands-off policy and the emergence of a legally
imposed professionalism in the correctional system).
50. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 568 (1974) (deferring to the "sound discretion of corrections officials" to de-
termine, within limits, the appropriate procedural measures to use for certain
agency hearings that are adverse to inmates given concerns regarding security and
rehabilitative goals).
51. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987). Operating a prison falls
"peculiarly within the province of the legislature and executive branches," and
"separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint." Id. Recently,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals further explained the reasoning behind this
deferential treatment:
When determining programming at an individual prison under the re-
strictions of a limited budget, prison officials must make hard choices.
They must balance many considerations, ranging from the characteristics
of the inmates at that prison to the size of the institution, to determine
the optimal mix of programs and services.
Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 732 (8th Cir. 1994).
52. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. This combination of judicial deference to prison
administrations and the recognized constitutional rights of prisoners has created
"a lot of confusion out there about where states' rights to run their prisons end,
and constitutional protections of prisoners begin."' Deborah Sharp, Worst of the
Worst'Flood out of Florida Prisons, USA TODAY, Nov. 27, 1996, at 3A. In addition,
judicial deference to the "highly discretionary" authority of prison administrators
makes it difficult to protect the rights of inmates because "opportunities abound
for discriminatory practices that are difficult to detect." Douglas C. McDonald &
David Weisburd, Segregation and Hidden Discrimination in Prisons: Reflections on
a Small Study of Cell Assignments, in CORRECTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE, su-
pra note 45, at 146, 150-51.
53. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see also Elizabeth M. Parker, Minn. Dep't of Trans.,
The Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act After a Decade of Change: The State
Agency Perspective, in THE MINNESOTA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AFTER A
DECADE OF CHANGE § III, at 8 (1986) ("[Ilt is generally held that an agency need
only establish a rational basis to support its rules, that is, a reasonable connection
between the problem sought to be remedied and the proposed remedy for that
problem."). For a regulation to be reasonable, courts should examine several fac-
tors, including whether there is a valid and rational nexus between the regulation
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the court will uphold it. 54 The Court reasoned that applying strict
scrutiny, which is the typical standard of review for alleged viola-
tions of the fundamental rights of citizens, would interfere with
the ability of prison officials to devise "innovative solutions" to the
many problems arising in the course of prison administration. 55
B. Profile of the Female Inmate Population
The correctional system's female population profile reveals
the results of the historical adaptations in the correctional system
and exposes some of the problems facing the modern system, in-
cluding distinctions between male and female inmates. If correc-
tional institutions acknowledged and worked with these differ-
ences, they would have important implications for the rehabili-
tative and support programming in the facilities.
56
Many social problems are more prevalent within the female
inmate population than the male population. First, while the in-
mate population is still primarily male, the number of female pris-
oners is increasing at a much faster rate.57 In trying to identify
and the legitimate government interest. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
54. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
55. Id.
56. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 8.
57. See id. at 12 (statement by Brenda Smith, counsel for the National
Women's Law Center); see also ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 3 (reporting the
annual increase in the female and male prison populations). From 1980 to 1992,
the number of women in prison increased by 275% while the population of male
inmates increased by 160%. Hearings, supra note 8, at 12. Additionally, for each
year since 1981, the female population in correctional facilities has increased by a
higher percentage than the male population. ACA STUDY, supra note 21, at 1; see
also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATION'S PRISON
POPULATION GREW ALMOST 9 PERCENT LAST YEAR (Aug. 9, 1995) (stating the num-
ber of female inmates increased by 10.6% in 1994 whereas the number of male in-
mates grew by 8.5%); cf. Sue Kline, A Profile of Female Offenders in the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, FED. PRISONS J., Spring 1992, at 33 (stating that the female
prison population grew at a faster rate than the male population in seven of the
ten years between 1981 and 1991). As a result of this growth, there were 50,409
women incarcerated in 1992 compared to 833,184 men. Hearings, supra note 8, at
12 (statement by Brenda Smith, counsel for the National Women's Law Center).
The unequal number of male and female inmates, and the alarming rate of the
population's increase exists at all levels of the system. By 1994, the gender dis-
parity in the population had increased, as there were 434,838 men and 48,879
women in the nation's 3,300 jails. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE NATION'S JAILS HOLD RECORD 490,442 INMATES (Apr. 30, 1995). By
the end of 1995, there were about 1,078,357 inmates in the state and federal pris-
ons, which primarily house convicted inmates who are usually serving out a sen-
tence of longer than one year; in comparison, jails normally hold people who are
either awaiting trial or serving out gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor sentences,
which are generally for less than a year. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ALMOST 1.6 MILLION MEN AND WOMEN IN THE NATION'S PRISONS
AND JAILS (Aug. 18, 1996). Of those in a state or federal prison, women repre-
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the causes of this trend, scholars have linked the increasing female
crime rate variously to the emancipation of women in society at
large,5 8 to socioeconomic factors 59 and to the approach of the crimi-
nal justice system itself.60 Second, large percentage of female in-
mates experienced some type of abuse before their incarceration 61
which contributed to the development of their criminal psyche.62
Third, most women offenders have a history of poverty 63 and many
have addictions to controlled substances. 64 Finally, family obliga-
sented 6.1% of the inmate population. Id. These numbers reflect a 113% increase
in the inmate population in state and federal prisons and local jails since 1985. Id.
58. See Fletcher & Moon, supra note 22, at 11; see, e.g., Nanci Koser Wilson,
The Industrialization of Wilderness: Women, Crime and Rurality, in RURAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CONDITIONS, CONSTRAINTS & CHALLENGES 147, 164 (Thomas
D. McDonald et al. eds., 1996) (explaining that women, as do men, tend to turn to
crime as a solution for economic crises when they work outside the home). For a
thorough discussion of this theory, see FREDA ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE
OF THE NEW FEMALE CRIMINAL (1975) and RITA J. SIMON, WOMEN AND CRIME
(1975) (explaining that the existing disparities between the male and female crime
rates are due to socialization rather than to biology).
59. See Fletcher & Moon, supra note 22, at 11. In 1991, women were usually
in federal prisons for convictions for economic crimes, such as drug-related of-
fenses (almost 64%), property offenses (6.3%) and extortion, bribery or fraud
(6.2%). Hearings, supra note 8, at 12.
60. See, e.g., Meda Chesney-Lind, Rethinking Women's Imprisonment: A Criti-
cal Examination of Trends in Female Incarceration, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND WOMEN OFFENDERS, VICTIMS, AND WORKERS 105 (Barbara Raffel
Price & Natalie J. Sokoloff eds., McGraw-Hill 1995) (1982) (attributing the rise in
female incarceration to shifts in criminal justice policies rather than to a change in
the behavior of women). Given the high percentage of women serving sentences for
drug-related offenses, see supra note 59, the war on drugs may explain part of the
increase in the number of women in prison, see Fletcher & Moon, supra note 22, at 8.
61. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 13 (statement by Brenda V. Smith, counsel
for the National Women's Law Center). Prior to being incarcerated, 41% of women
in prison and 44% of those in jails were physically or sexually abused. Id.; cf. ACA
STUDY, supra note 21, at 56-57 (reporting that 53% of adult female inmates were
victims of physical abuse and 35.6% were victims of sexual abuse). As of 1993,
2,000 female inmates were serving time for defending themselves against their
batterers. Hearings, supra note 8, at 13.
62. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 14. "[P]hysical and sexual victimization and
the low self-esteem that accompanies this abuse" are among the key issues that
generate criminal conduct. Id.
63. See id. at 8-9 ('The female prison population is overwhelmingly comprised
of low-income women of color caring for dependent children with little family or
social support."). With 53% of those in prison and 74% of those in jail, the majority
of female inmates in 1993 were unemployed prior to serving their sentence. Id. at
12. The sting of unemployment is strengthened by the fact that 80% of incarcer-
ated women are mothers, and 70% of them are single parents. Id. These figures
correlate with the fact that the majority of women serve time for economic or other
non-violent crimes. See supra note 59 (listing examples of these crimes). In com-
parison, drug offenses and property crimes account for 65% of the crimes for which
men were incarcerated. Hearings, supra note 8, at 8.
64. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 12. See generally Dreama G. Moon et al.,
Patterns of Substance Use Among Women in Prison, in WOMEN PRISONERS, supra
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tions contribute to the needs and demands in inmates' lives out-
side of the correctional system.65 While many of the incarcerated
women committed economic crimes, their substance abuse mirrors
the drug crises facing the entire country today.66
C. Constitutional Considerations of the Right to Access
Correctional Programs
Systemically, the penal system has returned to an emphasis
on the custodial and punitive aspects of corrections. 67 Neverthe-
less, both state and federal prisons utilize various services to pre-
pare inmates for their reentry into society and to improve living
conditions within prisons. 68 One of the most common community-
note 22, at 45, 45-54 (describing the high level of substance abuse among women in
the correctional system). In 1993, 34% of women in jails were serving time for
drug-related offenses. Hearings, supra note 8, at 12. In addition, the Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons reported that in 1991 64% of women in federal prisons were serv-
ing time for drug offenses in comparison to 56% of federal male prisoners. Id. at 8.
65. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 12. Not only are the majority of female in-
mates mothers, see supra note 63, but 85% of them also had custody of their chil-
dren prior to their incarceration whereas 47% of the fathers in prison had custody
of their children prior to serving their time. Id. Because of the disproportionately
high number of female inmates with family obligations, the incarceration of
women has a more significant impact on family stability than the incarceration of
men. Id. at 9.
66. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 7 (commenting that the con-
centration of inmates with substance abuse problems reflects a larger societal
problem); Moon et al., supra note 64, at 47 ('Another reason that women are in-
creasingly involved with drug-related crimes is that society in general is more in-
volved with drugs. Drug and alcohol addiction are among the most common and
serious social problems in U.S. society."). See generally supra notes 58-66 and ac-
companying text (explaining that the female prison population suffers problems
stemming from economics, abuse, addictions and family obligations).
67. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (tracing the reversion of soci-
ety and the correctional system from an emphasis on rehabilitation to an emphasis
on punishment and just deserts).
68. See FORUM, supr'a note 42, at 73-75 (briefing by J. Michael Quinlan, Direc-
tor of the Federal Bureau of Prisons). Many institutional programs serve multiple
functions. "Work, self-improvement activities, education, vocational training, and
other programs not only reduce the debilitating idleness of an overcrowded institu-
tion, but offer important security management benefits such as supervised time
out of cells, and enhanced security-and consequently public safety." Id. at 73; see
also SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 71 (explaining that vocational programs have his-
torically improved the "custodial and budgetary state of the prison system"). Addi-
tionally, education and literacy programs help to prepare inmates to "function law-
fully in society." FORUM, supra note 42, at 75. Vocational training programs
provide "male and female offenders" with preparation for employment upon their
release from prison. Id. Moreover, some jails have found that by providing other
services, such as crisis intervention specialists, inmates receive appropriate care
while the corrections officers do not have to handle mental health problems and
can thereby focus on other aspects of their jobs, such as security. Suzanne M.
Morris et al., Mental Health Services in United States Jails, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND BEHAVIOR, Mar. 1997, at 3, 12-13.
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based services is parole. 69 Parole authorizes an inmate to serve
the remainder of her or his sentence outside of the prison provided
that the inmate follows certain conditions. 70 In this sense, parole
is part of the process of rehabilitating the inmate into society and
is not part of the criminal prosecution. 71 However, prisoners do
not have a right to any type of rehabilitative program. 72 If the
state chooses to provide. a program for inmates, it may establish
the terms and conditions of the program. 73
69. In 1995, there were more than 700,000 adults on parole under federal,
state, or local jurisdictions. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE POPULATION REACHES ALMOST 3.8 MILLION 1
(June 30, 1996) [hereinafter PROBATION AND PAROLE]; see also KATHLEEN MAGUIRE
& ANN L. PASTORE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1995, at 592 (1996) (identifying the number of adults on parole under
state and federal jurisdictions). Of this number, 10% were women. PROBATION
AND PAROLE, supra, at 3.
70. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-82 (1972). The inmate is re-
leased from prison "based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable promise of
being able to return to society and function as a responsible, self-reliant person."
Id. at 482. A parolee may enjoy many freedoms, but those freedoms are subject to
the conditions of parole, which a parole officer enforces. Id. "Supervision [of a pa-
rolee] is not directly by the court but by an administrative agency, which is some-
times an arm of the court and sometimes of the executive." Id. at 480; see, e.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAwS § 791.238(1) (1994) (stating that a parolee is under the control
of the state department of corrections). If the parolee violates those conditions, the
parole authority must determine whether to revoke the parole status and return
the parolee to prison. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479-80; see also PROBATION AND
PAROLE, supra note 69, at 15 (stating that if a parolee violates a rule or commits
another offense, he or she is subject to being returned to prison). Upon revocation
of parole, it is generally within the discretion of the parole board whether the pa-
rolee will receive good-time credit toward the completion of his or her sentence for
the time served on parole. Id.; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.238(4)
(authorizing the state parole board to use its discretion to determine whether to
grant good time credit to a parole violator). In general, the provision of good-time
credits for inmates varies from state to state. DEAN J. CHAMPION, PROBATION,
PAROLE AND COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 206-09 (2d ed. 1996).
71. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. Because the revocation of parole is not part
of a criminal prosecution, all of the rights granted to a defendant in a criminal pro-
ceeding are not granted to a parolee at a parole revocation hearing. Nevertheless,
parole revocation is a denial of freedom, and the hearings must follow several spe-
cific procedures that ensure minimum due process. See id. at 487-90. While proce-
dures may vary by jurisdiction, generally a panel or a parole board conducts parole
hearings. U.S. PAROLE COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROCEDURES MANUAL 12-
13, 106 (1983). A hearing, whether for the purpose of granting or revoking parole,
involves the interests of one individual and takes testimony from interested par-
ties, while the parole board's decision is the final outcome regarding the person's
past behavior. Id.; see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 573 (1974) (explaining that
an inmate's behavior in prison is frequently an important criteria for parole decisions).
72. See Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); see also Hinkle v. Ohio Parole Auth., 419 F.2d 130,
131 (1969) (stating inmates do not have a right to parole). Thus, states are not
compelled to provide any type of rehabilitation, including parole. Id.
73. Hinkle, 419 F.2d at 131.
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Even though there is no right to these services, if the state
provides them, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids it from providing the program in a discrimina-
tory manner. 74 When reviewing a government service, the judici-
ary applies a different standard of review depending upon whose
rights the program allegedly violates. 75 Claims involving the clas-
sification of individuals by gender receive intermediate scrutiny,76
which requires that the classification be substantially related to an
important government interest if it is to be upheld. 77 The basic but
essential question in equal protection analysis is whether the chal-
lenged regulation advances the government objective in a manner
consistent with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 78
It is important to note, however, that for a court to engage in
equal protection analysis, the person whose rights are allegedly
violated by the government must be similarly situated to those on
74. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963) (holding that
due process and equal protection require a state to provide counsel for defendants
at a criminal appeal where the state provides a right of appeal because once a state
makes a right or procedure available it must make it equally available to everyone).
75. Strict scrutiny is the highest level of review that a court will apply to an
equal protection claim. The standard requires that a government classification
must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. See, e.g.,
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 470 (1989) (applying strict scru-
tiny to a city policy that discriminated against white contractors). Courts reserve
this high level of review for discrete and insular minority groups; more specifically,
this high standard is applied to classifications based on race and national origin.
See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 n.6 (1996).
The middle level of review is intermediate scrutiny. This standard requires
that the government classification be substantially related to an important gov-
ernmental objective. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to a gender discrimination case).
Rational basis review is the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. This standard
only requires that the government classification be reasonably related to a legiti-
mate government interest. In other words, a court will only strike a law if the
classification is "purely arbitrary." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78 (1911). This level of review allows a court to defer to a government classifi-
cation if there is some plausible basis for it, even if that was not the actual basis
for the government action, because the Court has "never insisted that a legislative
body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute." United States R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
76. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98 (1976).
77. Id. at 197. In applying intermediate scrutiny to gender discrimination
cases, the Court has ruled that administrative convenience is not an important
government interest. Id. at 198. Additionally, savings in time, money and effort
do not justify gender-based discrimination. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
217 (1977). Furthermore, in contrast to rational basis review, see supra note 75,
the justification for a gender classification "must be genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation." United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.
78. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
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the other side of the government's classification.7 9 In many of the
equal protection claims brought by female inmates, the courts
have ruled that the female and male inmates are not similarly
situated.80 By making this determination, courts avoid the consti-
tutional question of whether the government action violated the
Equal Protection Clause, which frees them from conducting a full
constitutional analysis.8' In several cases, the courts have only re-
quired "parity of treatment" of male and female inmates.8 2 This
minimum level of judicial review has played an important role in
the development of the correctional system, the discrimination ex-
isting within it and the tensions underlying it. To better under-
stand these issues, it is important to analyze the administration of
the correctional system.
II. The Administrative Perspective
To fully understand the discrimination in the corrections sys-
tem, it is necessary to understand the system that enables the dis-
crimination to exist. The corrections system and its various de-
partments on the federal and state levels are independent
79. Courts have interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as being a "direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
216 (1982)). "To be 'similarly situated,' groups need not be identical in makeup,
they need only share commonalities that merit similar treatment." Betts v.
McCaughtry, 827 F. Supp. 1400, 1405 (W.D. Wis. 1993).
80. See, e.g., Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (holding male
and female inmates are not similarly situated for purposes of prison program-
ming); Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 733 (8th Cir. 1994)
(same). But see Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1078-79 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(holding male and female inmates are similarly situated and that the disparity in
facilities between male and female inmates violated the Equal Protection Clause);
Kiinger, 31 F.3d at 733 n.4 (noting that male and female inmates are similarly
situated for purposes of the process by which the department of corrections makes
decisions). Courts explain that different resources, physical separation, security
levels and characteristics of the inmates' profiles distinguish male and female in-
mates for programming purposes. See supra Part I.B (profiling the female inmate
population and distinguishing it from the male population); see, e.g., Klinger, 31
F.3d at 731-32 (explaining why male and female inmates are not similarly situated
for purposes of programming).
81. See, e.g., Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1079 (holding that equal protection in the
prison setting requires only parity of treatment between male and female inmates).
82. See id. Parity of treatment has a less concrete meaning in comparison to
intermediate scrutiny. Courts have consistently held that parity represents some-
thing less than identical treatment. See, e.g., id. at 1079, 1087 (applying the parity
of treatment standard and indicating that it is a sufficient standard for reviewing
state actions in the treatment of its prisoners. However, even in Glover, where the
court found that the parity of treatment test was not satisfied, the proposed remedies
have not taken effect because they are so vague. Safarik, supra note 20, at 341 n.21.
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administrative agencies. 83 As such, departments of corrections,
prison administrations and each correctional agency on the federal
and state levels exercise considerable discretion in interpreting
and applying the powers that the legislatures delegated to them.
8 4
However, the actions of an agency and judicial review of agency
decisions are limited by the rules of administrative law, including
either the federal Administrative Procedure Act8 5 or the relevant
state-law equivalent.86
83. Generally, the various components of the correctional system fall under the
classification of administrative agencies. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.313
(1994) (stating that the Michigan Department of Corrections is a state agency un-
der the state administrative procedures act). Administrative agencies "are estab-
lished in fields where it is too difficult to state a practical, general rule." LEE
LOEVINGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AS A PARADIGM OF GOVERNMENT: A
SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1 (1965). Agencies have specified areas
of jurisdiction for which they formulate specific policies, manage large organiza-
tions and exercise executive power. See id. at 2. Their primary purpose "is the
effectuation of some policy which is thought to be in the public interest, rather
than merely the securing of justice between parties with conflicting private inter-
ests." Id. at 10.
Upon the suggestion of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, how-
ever, some States have individually excluded parole boards from their statutory
definition of agency because although the boards "are authorized to hold hearings,
[they] exercise purely discretionary functions." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 8 (1946) [hereinafter MODEL STATE APA].
84. Because courts do not substitute their judgment for that of the agency with
respect to the wisdom or propriety of a decision, agencies have significant discre-
tion in pursuing their policy objectives. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (requiring an explanation for an agency policy
decision which was inconsistent with a statutory prohibition); Murphy v. Oakland
County Dep't of Health, 290 N.W.2d 139 (Mich. 1980) (prohibiting a reviewing
court from substituting its opinion for that of an agency when there is evidence in
the record to support the agency decision); see also supra notes 49-51 and accom-
panying text (explaining the continuing judicial deference given to correctional
agencies). In addition, statutory provisions often grant broad powers to depart-
ments of corrections to use their discretion to make decisions. See, e.g., MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 791.201 (1994) (creating the state department of corrections);
§ 791.204 (granting the department of corrections exclusive jurisdiction over
"paroles and penal institutions" and other correctional programs); § 791.206
(authorizing the director of the department to announce rules pursuant to the ad-
ministrative procedures act of 1969 which provide for the "management and con-
trol of state penal institutions"); § 791.265(a) (granting director of the department
of corrections authority to "extend the limits of confinement of a prisoner" to par-
ticipate, inter alia, in training or educational programs).
85. See 5 U.S.C. § 551-706 (1994) [hereinafter APA]. The APA provides
"comprehensive regulation of procedures in many agencies."' Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523
(1978) (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950)). Congress has
amended the federal APA very little since its enactment in 1946. STEPHEN G.
BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXTS AND CASES 23 (3d ed. 1992). The APA developed from a recom-
mendation of an executive Committee on Administrative Management, which
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When examining an act or decision of an agency, such as a
state or the federal department of corrections, it is necessary to de-
termine whether the agency had legal authority to act on the issue
in question. A reviewing court must first determine whether the
applicable statute authorized the agency to act on the issue.8 7 If it
did, the court and the agency must defer to the congressional in-
tent.8 8 Then the court turns to the Constitution to ensure that the
lines drawn by the legislature in conferring a service to prisoners
are constitutionally permissible.8 9 If the lines are constitutional,
then it is necessary to apply the nondelegation test90 and deter-
emerged from the widespread concern that the government needed some legisla-
tion to "respond to criticisms of the administrative process' fairness and to ration-
alize disparate administrative practices along more consistent lines." Id.; see also
Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Administrative Procedure Act, in PAMPHLETS ON ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE no. 2, 1 (providing the legislative history of the APA).
86. While the APA is a federal statute and thus only applies to federal agen-
cies, during the last thirty years, many states "have also codified administrative
law principles in state administrative procedure acts." BREYER & STEWART, supra
note 85, at 23 n.33 (citing 13 U.L.A. 347 (1978 pamphlet)). Twenty-seven states
and the District of Columbia have codified the Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. Prec. § 24.201, References and Annots. (West
1996). Michigan, the location of the Huron Valley Women's Facility at issue in
Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979), is one of these states. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.201-24.328 (1994).
This Note uses the Michigan Administrative Procedure Act and Michigan's
related case law to exemplify the state-law equivalent of the federal APA and fed-
eral case law. Because the codified Model State Administrative Procedure Acts
nearly mirror the federal APA, BREYER & STEWART, supra note 85, at 23 n.33, the
following administrative law review applies to both federal and state agencies.
87. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984); see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.306 (1994) (codifying the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act and authorizing courts to strike down agency
decisions that violate statutory authority). Before actually examining an agency's
action, a reviewing court must determine whether Congress directly addressed the
issue in question. Id. If the statute specifically addresses the issue in question,
the court must ensure that the agency acted in accordance with the statute. Id.
If, however, Congress did not clearly address the issue in the statute, then the
court must look to the agency's interpretation of the statute to determine "whether
the agency's action is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842-43.
88. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. If Congress did not directly address an issue
via statute, then the court must determine only whether the agency's interpreta-
tion of the statute "in the context of this particular program is a reasonable one."
Id. at 845.
89. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1974) (holding sen-
tencing legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause as it applied to women).
90. The Supreme Court first expressed the nondelegation doctrine in Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). It explained that the concept that "Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as
vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by
the Constitution." Id. at 692.
[Vol. 15:505
GENDER CRISIS
mine whether the statute constitutionally delegates authority to
the department of corrections to interpret and apply the law.9 1
After establishing that the agency had the authority to act, it
is necessary to determine whether the agency action was proper
both substantively and procedurally. Substantive review of an
agency action entails review of factual and legal determinations.
92
While an agency generally has the authority to exercise its discre-
tion in making substantive determinations, there are some limita-
tions on that power. First, the reviewing court must ensure that
the agency reasonably interpreted its statutory power.93 Second,
the federal APA and its state-law equivalent place restraints on
the substance of agency decisions, but the level of restraint de-
pends on whether the agency maintained a formal94 or informal 95
record.96 If the record is formal, then the APA provides for judicial
91. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (explaining that there are
few limits on the congressional power to create agencies and to delegate power to
them but that courts retain judicial review over the legal, factual, and procedural
aspects of the decisions). But see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 542.51 (1935) (striking the validity of a congressional statute as an
unconstitutional delegation of power). The nondelegation doctrine has been used
to strike the statutory delegation of power in only two cases. See Schechter Poul-
try, 295 U.S. at 542-51; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-30 (1935).
In a recent application of the doctrine, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a statute was an overbroad delegation of power and as such that it was un-
constitutional under the nondelegation doctrine. South Dakota v. United States
Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th. Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 117 S.
Ct. 286 (1996).
92. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 53 (explaining courts have the authority to review
the factual and legal decisions of agencies); see, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 28
(providing for state judicial review of agency decisions of law and fact).
93. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (explaining the two step
process used to determine whether an agency acted reasonably under a statute);
see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.306 (1994) (exemplifying state administrative
procedure acts that follow the federal standards by barring agency decisions if they
exceed their statutory authority); Goolsby v. City of Detroit, 535 N.W.2d 568
(Mich. 1995) (stating that courts shall set aside legal rulings of administrative
agencies if they violate the a state statute).
94. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (requiring
a formal record of the agency decision and the reasons supporting it to enable the
reviewing court to apply a substantial evidence standard of review). Formal pro-
ceedings are subject to sections 556 and 557 of the APA, which require a record as
the basis of an agency decision. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (1994).
95. While informal adjudication is not subject to APA regulations, informal
rule-making proceedings are subject to section 553 of the APA, which requires no-
tice to the public of an agency hearing and an opportunity for the public to com-
ment on the issue. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973)
(holding that an agency has the discretion to choose either formal or informal rule-
making unless the applicable statute uses a clear statement to require a formal
process). The type of record influences the level of review because judicial review
of an agency's decision is limited to the record from the administrative proceeding.
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review based on substantial evidence found in the record as a
whole. 97 The APA provides for a lesser, more deferential review
using an arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion standard if
there is only an informal agency record.98 In either situation,
however, the standards are essentially reasonableness tests.99
The common law of judicial review of administrative decision-
making and the United States Constitution present more general
restraints on the substance of an agency's decision. Courts have
traditionally required an agency to substantively comply with its
own prior actions. 100 When reviewing inconsistent or unsubstanti-
ated agency decisions, the Supreme Court has applied a "hard
look" doctrine.' 0l In essence, the standard requires an agency to
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAwS § 24.304 (1994) (limiting judicial review to the record
of an agency under its state codification of the Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act); Greenbriar Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Department of Pub. Health, 310
N.W.2d 380 (Mich. 1981).
97. See, e.g., Universal Camera, 340 U.S. 474 (applying a substantial evidence
standard of review to a formal rule-making proceeding); Murphy v. Oakland
County Dep't of Health, 290 N.W.2d 139 (Mich. 1980) (applying the same standard
under the state administrative procedure act). This standard of review has been
codified in the APA and the Model Administrative Procedure Act as codified in
several states, which requires a court to utilize a "substantial evidence" standard
when reviewing facts found in formal rule-making. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1997);
see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.306(106) (1994) (adopting the federal "substantial
evidence" standard in its codification of the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act). The standard looks for substantial evidence on the record as a whole to sup-
port an agency decision. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 490. This considers the
viewpoint of a reasonable expert, rather than a reasonable person, examining the
record without bias. However, even after applying a substantial evidence test, a
reviewing court needs to apply the APA "catch-all" standard to the agency action;
specifically, the court must ensure that the agency decision is not "arbitrary, capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion" in any manner for the court to ultimately uphold
the action. 5 U.S.C. § 706; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.306; Association of Data Proc-
essing v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
98. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 322 U.S. 194 (1947) [hereinafter Chenery
II] (upholding an agency decision because it satisfied the arbitrary, capricious, or
abuse of discretion standard even though the decision did not have a record to
support it). The APA and the Model State Administrative Procedure Act codified
the deferential standard that the Chenery II Court adopted. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see,
e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 24.306. It serves as a check on the agency decision to
use adjudication or rule-making.
99. Compare supra note 97 (explaining that the application of the arbitrary,
capricious or abuse of discretion standard is the final step of the substantial evi-
dence test) and note 98 (identifying arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion as
the standard to apply when reviewing an informal agency record) with note 75
(stating that under rational basis review a court will only strike down a govern-
mental classification if it is "purely arbitrary").
100. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 41-42 (1983); see also DeBeaussaert v. Shelby Township, 333 N.W.2d 22 (Mich.
1982) (applying the federal requirement to the state by requiring a state agency to
follow its own rules).
101. See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42 (noting that an agency must explain a
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provide a reasoned analysis for a change in its policies or for an in-
consistency between its decision and the statute. 0 2 Additionally,
common law restrains agency regulations that are retroactive.
10 3
Lastly, the Constitution limits the substantive decisions of gov-
ernmental agencies just as it limits other state actors. 104
Finally, the courts must engage in a procedural review over
the agency's action. 0 5 First, the agency must follow any specific
procedure or hearing specified in the organic statute. 106 If the
statute does not impose specific procedural requirements, then the
agency generally has the discretion to choose between either a
formal or informal record and either an adjudicative 0 7 or rule-
change in policy); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 419-21 (1971) (applying hard look review, remanding for plenary review
of agency record and requiring an explanation for the agency decision which was
inconsistent with a statutory prohibition).
102. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42. The hard look standard functions to en-
sure that the agency's decision is not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discre-
tion. See id. at 42-43. As an example, while an agency needs to be able to "adapt
their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances,"' that does not
require the agency to deregulate its area. Id. at 42 (citing Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968)).
103. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (explaining that
retroactivity is valid only with respect to adjudication and that retroactive rule-
making should be avoided unless a statute gives explicit power to the agency to do
so). But see Miriam Ctr. for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1978)
(allowing for rule-making that is secondarily retroactive if it satisfies an arbitrary,
capricious and abuse of discretion standard because it only changes the conse-
quences of a past action whereas rules that are primarily retroactive change the
legality of the act itself).
104. See, e.g., the discussion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Amendment prohibits any state from discriminating against certain minorities);
Goolsby v. City of Detroit, 535 N.W.2d 568 (Mich. 1995) (stating that courts shall
set aside legal rulings of administrative agencies if they violate the Constitution).
105. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.306 (1994) (codifying the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act to authorize a court to strike down an agency deci-
sion if the agency violated required procedures).
106. Cf. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973)
(explaining that a statute can only require an agency to use a formal procedure by
clearly requiring it).
107. An adjudicative hearing is similar to a trial with respect to purpose and
procedure in that it addresses the interests of one entity and involves testimony,
evidence and competing sides. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994). Technically, adjudica-
tion is an "agency process for the formulation of an order," which is a "final dispo-
sition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an
agency in a matter other than rule-making but including licensing." Id.
While agencies have this quasi-judicial function, however, they are notably dif-
ferent from courts. First, in addition to the fact that agency members are not
judges, "precedent is of considerably less importance in administrative proceed-
ings." LOEVINGER, supra note 83, at 5. Second, agencies are more likely than a
court to decide cases in a certain manner to pursue their policy objectives. See id.
Third, agency boards are not equivalent to unbiased magistrates; in fact, agencies
maintain a continuing interest in their respective fields of expertise. See id. at 11.
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making1 08 hearing. 09 Additionally, the APA or its state-law
equivalents requires that the agency's procedural selection must
not be arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion." 0 The APA
also requires an agency to follow certain technical procedures de-
pending on the type of hearing it selects."' Beyond statutory re-
Moreover, "administrative proceedings tend to be more regulatory than adversary,
more legislative than adjudicatory." Id. at 10. Finally, agencies handle a larger
quantity of cases than courts do, and they issue "impersonal institutional opin-
ion[s]" which do not fully ensure that the conclusion reached by the agency is
valid. Id. at 7.
108. In contrast to adjudication, a rule-making proceeding is similar to a legisla-
tive session in that it addresses the rights of many. When the proceeding is infor-
mal, it only requires the agency to provide sufficient notice of the hearing to the
public and provide the public with an opportunity to comment on the issue
(commonly referred to as a notice and comment hearing). See 5 U.S.C. § 551.
Rule-making is the "agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing
an... agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect." Id.
109. See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); see also
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) [hereinafter Chenery 1A (ruling that
agencies have the power to choose either an adjudicative or a rule-making hear-
ing). But see 5 U.S.C. § 551 (eliminating agency discretion in limited circum-
stances by requiring adjudicative proceedings for licensing decisions and rule-
making proceedings for decisions involving "rates, wages ... facilities, appliances,
services or allowances therefor ... or practices bearing on any of the foregoing");
but see, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 24.291 (1994) (incorporating the federal limita-
tion of agency discretion into its state codification of the Model State Administra-
tive Procedure Act). Regardless of whether the agency chooses an adjudicative or
rule-making proceeding, the "hard look" test may apply to the agency decision be-
cause the doctrine applies to both types of proceedings. See Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971); see also supra notes 101-02
and accompanying text (explaining the hard look doctrine as a requirement that
an agency reasonably explain its decision if the decision represents a policy change
or an inconsistency with the applicable statute).
110. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.306 (adopting the federal
arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion standard in the state codification of the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act). An agency abuses its discretion by
using an adjudicative hearing when the primary purpose of the agency is to an-
nounce a rule of law. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974)
(explaining that in some instances the use of adjudication may be arbitrary and an
abuse of discretion). Similarly, the use of a rule-making proceeding would be an
abuse of discretion if it was used to avoid a forthcoming adjudication between a
specific inmate and the institution. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759 (1969) (explaining that in some situations the use of a rule-making pro-
ceeding is an abuse of discretion by the agency).
111. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (setting forth procedural requirements for rule-
making hearings) with 5 U.S.C. § 554 (setting forth procedural requirements for
adjudicatory hearings). An agency conducting a rule-making proceeding must pro-
vide a hearing for the public to express its views on a proposed regulation and give
the public notice of that hearing. 5 U.S.C. § 553. In comparison, the APA requires
an agency conducting an adjudicatory hearing to adhere to detailed procedures
that are essentially the same as those followed in a court of law, including notice of
the adjudication to the parties as well as the "submission and consideration of
facts, arguments, offers of settlement." 5 U.S.C. § 554; see also, e.g., MCH. COMP.
LAWS § 791.252 (1994) (detailing procedures for an adjudicative prison disciplinary
hearing that are similar to the federal procedures for an agency adjudication). In
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quirements, administrative common law requires agencies to fol-
low past procedures. 112 If the agency strays from past practice,
then it must explain why it is doing so. Finally, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also regulates the agency's
procedure by ensuring that the agency process is fair and reason-
able. 113 Due process is the "protection of the individual against ar-
bitrary action."11 4 These procedural restraints function together to
control agency discretion in the decision-making process.
115
III. Analyzing the Inequality of the Correctional System in
Light of the Administrative Perspective
Courts have held that the differing security needs and finan-
cial restraints of each correctional institution are so unique that
the judiciary should defer to the individualized determination of
prison officials regarding the policies and programs within their
respective institutions.1 1 6 Despite that seemingly logical conclu-
sion, there is a problem-a problem of constitutional proportions.
The fact that this judicial deference enables equal protection viola-
tions against female inmates in many institutions to continue is
undeniable and unacceptable. 1 17
The solution to this problem goes beyond acknowledging the
existence of the constitutional violation. The real and current
need is to find a solution to the infringement on the rights of fe-
male prisoners. In doing so, it is necessary to consider the sys-
general, the rule-making procedures are not as formal or specific as those required
for adjudication. Additionally, a reviewing court is generally banned from impos-
ing procedural requirements beyond those set forth in the APA on an agency con-
ducting a rule-making hearing. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
112. See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370
(1932) (holding that when an agency utilizes its legislative powers to announce a
rule, it must follow that rule in subsequent agency adjudications until the rule is
overturned in a subsequent rule-making proceeding); see also DeBeaussaert v.
Shelby Township, 333 N.W.2d 22 (Mich. 1982) (applying the federal requirement to
the state by requiring a state agency to follow its own rules).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
114. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937).
115. See, e.g., Chenery II, 322 U.S. 194 (1947) (upholding an agency decision be-
cause it was not a plain abuse of discretion).
116. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (stating that courts have held
that judicial deference to prison administrators is necessary and explaining the
reasoning behind the decisions).
117. See supra note 15 (identifying constitutional challenges against prison sys-
tems); see also supra notes 21-25 (describing some differences between programs
for male and female inmates); notes 49-51 (identifying the continuing judicial def-
erence to correctional agencies).
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temic characteristics of financial restraints and the desire for effi-
ciency. This cannot be done by simply answering whether the
Constitution, Title IX or any other legal tool will protect the rights
of inmates.118
Rather, a more viable way to find a solution to this constitu-
tional violation is to recognize the multidimensional aspects of the
problem. The problem is in fact three-dimensional: the type of
administrative hearing, the type of procedure applied in the hear-
ing and the rights at issue. First, the type of administrative
hearing is either adjudicative or rule-making. Second, the type of
procedure that the agency follows is either formal or informal.
Third, the nature of the rights at issue is either constitutional or
statutory. These elements, as illustrated, form three dimensions










Within each dimension, courts must ask two questions:
1) upon which part of the dimension should the review focus, and
2) whether the program or decision at issue satisfies the standard
or requirement of that dimension.
So far, the legal community has examined only one dimen-
sion, that is, the nature of the right being protected. To maximize
the power of the law and reach a just solution, the courts and the
legal community in general need to look at the remaining two di-
mensions which represent the process leading up to the decision.
In doing this, it is important to keep in mind that the problem is
not oppression in the traditional sense; rather, the problem is an
118. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (discussing the historical use
of these laws in suits by inmates).
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underlying systemic structure that enables personal 1 9 and institu-
tional biases 120 to affect the treatment of a minority group, such as
female inmates.
A. The Current Correctional System in an Administrative
Context
1. Type of Hearing: Adjudicative or Rule-Making
Corrections administrators use different hearings depending
on the situation. Parole hearings are a useful illustration of an
adjudicative hearing.' 2' The proceeding is essentially backward-
looking in that the parole decision based on the inmate's past ac-
tions. l22 Additionally, the decisions do not carry the weight of
precedent because there is no stare decisis in administrative
law. 123 Moreover, a decision is not even final for the party in the
hearing because parole can be revoked if the inmate violates a
condition of parole, 124 or parole may be granted at a later date to
the same inmate. Adjudication is preferred because it is the most
protective of individual rights and can account for the individual
facts of an inmate's case. 125
119. See supra note 107 (explaining that an agency's continuing interest in
cases distinguishes it from an unbiased magistrate). By enabling interested people
to hear cases, the agency structure enables personal biases to affect agency decisions.
120. Each agency addresses only a "specialized subject matter" which gives it a
"limited viewpoint" but not necessarily more social wisdom. LOEVINGER, supra
note 83, at 12. Because the agency and its members have this narrow perspective,
there is no neutral body to represent the broader social needs or the rights of the
inmates. Thus, this limited perspective reinforces existing institutional biases.
See id. at 13.
121. Compare notes 70-71 (identifying parole as a device for releasing inmates
early under the supervision of a correctional officer and the process used in parole
hearings) with note 107 (an adjudicative hearing addresses one entity and involves
testimony, evidence and competing sides).
122. Compare supra note 71 (explaining that a parole board's decision is the fi-
nal outcome of an inmate's past conduct) with supra note 103 (explaining secon-
dary retroactivity as a decision that affects the outcome but not the legality of a
past action).
123. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (explaining that while ad-
ministrative common law requires agencies to follow their own prior actions, an
agency can avoid this requirement by providing a reasoned explanation for its de-
cision) and note 107 (explaining that precedent is less important to administrative
agencies than to courts).
124. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing parole as a conditional
release from prison that can be revoked if the parolee violates the terms of parole).
125. Compare note 107 (comparing adjudicative hearings to trials because they
address the rights of one individual at a time) with note 108 (describing rule-
making proceedings as legislative in that they affect the rights of many individuals).
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The system also uses rule-making hearings because it is not
always efficient or wise to use adjudication. 126 When an organic
statute directly addresses an issue, the corrections department can
do nothing except abide by the statute. 127 However, during the
implementation process, the agency administrators conduct
meetings to determine how to apply the legislative order. While
the use of rule-making hearings to make decisions on a system-
wide basis is logical and efficient, it is not necessarily protective of
the individual rights of inmates. Administrative procedure acts
impose fewer specific rules on rule-making hearings than on adju-
dicative hearings.12 8 This gives the agency additional discretion,
which increases the chance that bias will affect the decisions of the
agency. Thus, inequality in the system initially surfaces in a rule-
making proceeding because that is where a correctional depart-
ment decides which classification of inmates will have access to a
program and under what circumstances.
Currently, there is an even greater chance that bias will infil-
trate the programming decision-making process because courts are
not reviewing the rule-making process when inmates challenge
programming decisions.129 By not reviewing this aspect of the ad-
ministrative agency, courts are allowing the discretion of correc-
tion agencies to go untempered. Thus, the rule-making stage in
the process raises significant concern.
2. Nature of the Procedure: Formal or Informal
Correctional system proceedings are often informal in that
the rationale for a decision need not be "on the record."'130 Because
126. Making policy decisions, such as what programs to offer in a given institu-
tion, or interpreting a substantive statute are examples of rule-making in the cor-
rectional system. The decisions affect the rights of several inmates based on a
common characteristic rather than on the specific facts involved in an individual's
case. This type of generalized decision-making typifies rule-making. See supra
note 108 and accompanying text.
127. "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter." Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984);
see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (explaining the two-step process used
to determine whether an agency acted reasonably under a statute).
128. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (comparing and detailing the
procedural requirements for rule-making and adjudicative hearings). Compare 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (setting forth procedural requirements for rule-making hearings)
with 5 U.S.C. § 554 (setting forth procedural requirements for adjudicatory hearings).
129. Cf. supra note 15 and accompanying text (identifying several cases that
challenged prison programming decisions but not the decision-making process).
130. Compare note 97 and accompanying text (explaining that formal proce-
dures require the rationale for decisions to be on the record) with note 98 and ac-
companying text (explaining the lesser requirements for an informal decision).
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statutes authorizing proceedings often do not require them to be
formal, agency administrators select the more efficient informal
method. 131 In effect, administrators can make decisions based on
knowledge within their area of expertise even if that information
is not on the record. 132
This informality opens the door to the denial of a program to
female inmates because of security reasons, financial constraints
or an underlying bias. The informal process allows agency ad-
ministrators to mask their biases in technical justifications, even if
they do so subconsciously. While some of the technical justifica-
tions may be completely unbiased and legitimate, there is no way
to know for certain because the decisions do not need to be justi-
fied on the record.
Under the principles of administrative law, courts have the
authority to review the department of correction's informal proce-
dure and factual findings133 using the arbitrary, capricious or
abuse of discretion standard. 3 4 Currently, however, by only con-
ducting traditional constitutional review, courts do not apply ad-
ministrative law principles when reviewing decisions of correction
agencies. 135 As a result, the judiciary is not exercising authority to
review procedures or factual findings.
In place of administrative review, courts defer to the decisions
of correctional agencies by applying only rational basis review. 136
Courts assert that prison administrators should be granted defer-
ence to avoid restricting their ability to find "innovative solu-
tions"137 and to allow them to achieve their objectives of security
131. An agency generally has the choice between formal and informal process.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text (explaining that an agency has the dis-
cretion to choose between formal and informal procedures unless the applicable
statute clearly says otherwise).
132. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.277 (1994) (authorizing an agency to use
its expertise and specialized knowledge when making a decision). However, be-
cause the rationale need not be explained, the agency could potentially make a de-
cision based on knowledge outside of its area of expertise as well.
133. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that courts have the
authority to review legal and factual determinations of agencies).
134. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (tracing the origin of the standard
in case law to its codification in the APA and state administrative procedure acts).
135. See, e.g., Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (holding
that under traditional equal protection standards Michigan's Huron Valley
Women's Facility violated the constitutional rights of its female inmates).
136. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (explaining that courts will uphold
a prison regulation if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest).
137. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also supra note 55 and accom-
panying text (explaining the Court's reasons for using the minimum level of scrutiny).
1997]
Law and Inequality
and rehabilitation. 138 Unfortunately, not all prison officials are ex-
perts139 and not all innovative solutions are legal.
Using rational basis review for gender discrimination claims
results in courts accepting constitutionally inadequate arguments
as explanations for discriminatory conduct by correctional agen-
cies. Specifically, rational basis review accepts an administrative
convenience argument as a justification for a regulation, whereas
intermediate scrutiny does not.' 40 While the economic' 4 ' or con-
venience rationale may explain the need for the institution to de-
prive some programming to some inmates to some degree, 142 it
fails to justify the discrimination against female inmates from a
legal 43 or logical 44 standpoint. Moreover, decisions not to provide
equal or adequate programming to female inmates do not neces-
138. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (identifying the Supreme Court's
deference to corrections officials given concerns regarding security and rehabilitation).
139. See supra note 42 (stating that the current correctional system has inexpe-
rienced staff managing sophisticated inmates).
140. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining that neither adminis-
trative convenience, savings in time, nor savings in money justifies gender dis-
crimination under intermediate scrutiny).
141. See supra note 27 (stating the economic rationale that programming costs
per capita are higher when there are fewer inmates using them).
142. While the per capita costs of programming are higher when they are pro-
vided for fewer inmates, see supra note 27, providing the services is not intrinsi-
cally prohibitive. Rather, the prison administrators have decided that the benefits
of providing the services do not justify the costs of the services. While this may be
systemically efficient, this economic argument fails to consider either the element
of fairness or the civil rights of women. "[S]eemingly practical considerations [such
as costs and administrative convenience] may not be used to 'justify official inac-
tion or unwillingness to operate a prison system in a constitutional manner."'
Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 1994) (McMillian, J.,
dissenting opinion) (quoting Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F. Supp. 1162, 1172 (E.D. Va.
1980) (citations omitted); see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977)
(savings in time, money and effort do not justify gender-based discrimination).
143. To justify a claim of gender discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Supreme Court has clearly held that a government regulation must be
substantially related to an important governmental interest. See supra notes 75-
77 (explaining the different levels of scrutiny for equal protection claims and iden-
tifying intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for gender dis-
crimination claims).
144. If correctional administrators rely on the economic rationale, then in-
creasing the number of inmates who have access to a program, i.e., to include both
male and female inmates, decreases the per capita costs of the program and in-
creases the system's incentive to provide it. While there may be some increase in
administrative costs by granting program access to both men and women, there
would still be a per capita cost reduction although it would not be directly propor-
tional. As an example, if one hundred male inmates had access to a work release
program, then granting program access to one hundred female inmates would de-
crease the per capita program costs by distributing the overhead expenses among
more people, but the reduction would be less than fifty percent because of a prob-
able increase in administrative expenses.
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sarily further the goal of institutional security.145 For these rea-
sons, the agency discretion that leads to those decisions should be
restricted or reviewed, but courts are failing to utilize the tools of
administrative law to review the discretion.
3. Nature of the Rights at Issue: Constitutional or
Statutory
The correctional system faces the issue of the rights of in-
mates. Inmates have constitutional and statutory rights. Primar-
ily, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment en-
sures that all similarly situated people shall be treated equally. 146
As this applies to inmates, the correctional system always must
work to treat similarly situated inmates equally with respect to
programming and facilities.147 Additionally, the correctional sys-
tem must satisfy the statutory rights of inmates by using its dis-
cretion to reasonably interpret the governing statutes. 14
This duality of rights reflects a tension in legal challenges of
correctional systems. Most female inmates who sue base their le-
145. See supra note 68 (identifying several benefits, including improved secu-
rity, of many programs in the correctional system). The Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons did not indicate that there was any different advantage gained
from these programs when they are provided for only male inmates as compared to
female inmates. Furthermore, because female inmates are less dangerous than
male inmates, see supra note 28, security is less likely to be jeopardized by grant-
ing them access to rehabilitative and vocational programs. For a regulation based
on a gender classification to be constitutional, it must be substantially related to
an important governmental interest. See supra notes 75-77 (explaining the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard and its application to cases of gender discrimination).
146. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; supra note 79 and accompanying text
(explaining the "similarly situated" requirement).
147. But see supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (explaining that some
courts have held male and female inmates are not similarly situated while other
courts only require prison administrations to satisfy the lesser constitutional
"parity of treatment' standard).
148. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (describing the Chevron doc-
trine wherein if a statute does not directly address an issue, the reviewing court
defers to the agency if the agency acted reasonably); notes 93-99 and accompany-
ing text (explaining that various restraints on agency action, including the Chev-
ron doctrine and the arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion standard are es-
sentially reasonableness tests). Courts, however, have not adequately ensured the
reasonableness of the actions of correctional agencies. Specifically, the judiciary
has not used the tools of administrative law, such as hard look review, when re-
viewing prison programming decisions to ensure that the agencies actually have
used their discretion to reasonably uphold a statutory authorization for prison
programming. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding unequal
rehabilitation services for female inmates by deferring to the decisions of the
prison administrators without examining the decisions under the administrative




gal actions on the Equal Protection Clause. 149 However, many
courts and prison administrations focus on the statutory grant of
power, such as the authorization for programs such as parole, vo-
cational training and furloughs. 150 It seems that these two groups
are on different levels in the legal arena.
Moreover, when analyzing female inmates' constitutional
claims, courts add to the complication by using a standard of re-
view appropriate for reviewing the use of statutory power. Specifi-
cally, the United States Supreme Court's standard for reviewing
the constitutionality of the provision of a prison program is essen-
tially rational basis review.15 1 This is not the appropriate standard
for an equal protection challenge claiming gender discrimina-
tion. 5 2 By using rational basis review, courts lower the constitu-
tional minimum requirement for gender discrimination. Addition-
ally, when a court starts to conduct true equal protection review, it
avoids the full analysis by holding that male and female inmates
are not similarly situated. 153 Thus, courts actually analyze the
reasonableness of the agency's use of its statutory power.
In administrative law, rational basis is the appropriate level
of scrutiny to use when reviewing the use of a statutory power,
such as the power to manage and control prisons. 54  However,
149. See, eg., supra note 15 (listing actions arising under the Equal Protection Clause).
150. See supra note 35 (authorizing the Federal Bureau of Prisons to implement
various correctional programs); note 84 (identifying the statutes that authorize the
Michigan Department of Corrections to manage and control the correctional pro-
grams in the state system).
151. See Parker, supra note 53, at 8 ("[It is generally held that an agency need
only establish a rational basis to support its rules."). Compare note 53 and accom-
panying text (explaining that a reviewing court may uphold an agency regulation
only if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest) and Turner, 482
U.S. at 78 (applying that reasonableness standard to a case challenging prison
services) with note 75 (explaining equal protection rational basis review) and
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (applying the standard).
152. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (describing intermediate
scrutiny and identifying it as the appropriate standard for equal protection gender
discrimination claims).
153. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (identifying cases in which courts
held male and female inmates not similarly situated). Courts defer to the judg-
ment of agencies after determining that male and female inmates are not similarly
situated. See, e.g., Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir.
1994) (upholding prison programming disparities after determining that male and
female inmates are not similarly situated).
154. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (explaining that various re-
straints on agency action are essentially reasonableness tests). After establishing
that an agency had the authority to interpret a law, a court must ensure that the
agency used its interpretative power reasonably. See supra note 93 and accompa-




rather than acknowledging the principles of administrative law,
courts maintain that they are conducting traditional constitutional
review. By using one administrative law standard of review and
no others, the courts misuse administrative law because its princi-
ples do not operate alone. In doing so, the courts enable the
agency's discretion to operate unfettered.
Thus, within the administrative model, the current correc-
tional system is primarily focusing on the statutory and informal
parts of the administrative cube. Additionally, the administrative
decisions of whether to provide a service or program to inmates
utilize rule-making procedures, which is the stage at which the









It is important to recognize this because in doing so one ac-
knowledges that the system is an intersection of the three admin-
istrative dimensions and is not simply one-dimensional. None of
these factors operates alone, and it is therefore difficult to find a
remedy to a problem by looking at only one dimension.
This is part of the present problem in the correctional system.
Courts allow the discretion of the correctional departments to go
unchecked by only reviewing the rights of inmates 156 and by not
155. In comparison, whether to give an individual female inmate access to a
service to which the correctional system provides access to male inmates uses ad-
judicative proceedings. See, e.g., supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (using
parole as an example of an adjudicative hearing). Because the administrative de-
cision of whether to provide services to female inmates is the preliminary and de-
terminative stage in the process and because it reveals the unconstitutional dis-
crimination, that is the stage illustrated in the administrative cube.
156. See generally supra note 15 (identifying several legal actions challenging
the correctional system on the basis of gender discrimination). The actions focus
on the constitutional rights of the inmates under the Equal Protection Clause and
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acknowledging the applicability of administrative law principles.
This unrestricted discretion enables underlying biases to affect the
decision-making process itself and thereby to jeopardize the rights
of female inmates. For this reason, as the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit indicated, focusing on the rights of
inmates independent of all other variables is not enough. 157 Ac-
tions should be brought on procedural grounds in light of the prin-
ciples of administrative law.
B. A Proposed Shift in the Correctional Administrative
Model
As the above analysis reveals, the process leading up to pro-
gramming decisions contributes to the inequality in the correc-
tional system. However, the legal system has not examined the
underlying process in its quest for equality in corrections; rather,
the focus has been on the unequal results of the process. 158 To rec-
tify the unconstitutional inequality affecting women in the prison
system, the judiciary should refocus its constitutional review in
light of the principles of administrative law and turn its attention
to the procedures in the system. 159 The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that courts retain judicial review of an agency's legal, fac-
tual and procedural decisions. 160 However, the Chevron deferen-
the statutory powers of the agency rather than on the process the agency invoked
to make its decision.
157. Kiinger, 31 F.3d at 734 (recognizing that to determine "whether the plain-
tiffs receive inferior programs because of their sex or for some other reason re-
quires looking beyond the fact that female prisoners are segregated from men and
examining the reasons behind the defendants' programming decisions").
158. See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text (identifying several cases that
challenged prison programming decisions but not the decision-making procedures).
159. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit suggested as
much in dismissing Klinger when it acknowledged there was a flaw in the decision
making process that hurt female inmates, but there was no violation under the
Equal Protection Clause because the decisions themselves were constitutional on
their face. Klinger, 31 F.3d at 734 n.4. The court asserted that a "proper equal
protection claim may allege differences in the process by which program decisions
were made at the prisons." Id. at 733.
Administrative law provides a method and standards for reviewing the proce-
dures of agencies. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text (describing the
procedural restraints on agency action ranging from the underlying substantive
statute to the applicable administrative procedure act to the Constitution). These
restraints and the judicial enforcement of the restraints are necessary to control
the high level of discretion given to and exercised by the agencies. In fact, due
process serves to "protect ... the individual against arbitrary action." Ohio Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937). Because of this, it is im-
perative that the courts ensure that correctional agencies do not use their discre-
tion to the point of being arbitrary.
160. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932).
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tial mandate diminished the power of a court to review agency
findings of law.161 Additionally, because of the deference given to
agency expertise, findings of fact receive minimal judicial re-
view. 162 Thus, the key to judicial review of agency decisions is pro-
cedural review.163
1. Judicial Review of the Administrative Rule-Making
Hearing
First, courts should utilize their authority under administra-
tive law to examine a department of corrections' use of rule-
making hearings. Generally, an agency has unbridled discretion
to decide whether to use an adjudicative or rule-making proceed-
ing, but there are some limitations.164 When reviewing a depart-
ment of corrections' decision to use a rule-making hearing, a court
must ensure that the selection does not violate a statutory proce-
dural mandate, 165 that the selection was not arbitrary, capricious
or an abuse of discretion 166 and that the selection is consistent
with past department practices. 167
161. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984).
162. See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text (outlining the standards
provided by the APA to review the substance, including the facts, of an agency
hearing). The deference given to an agency's findings of fact by a reviewing court
depends upon whether the agency maintained a formal or informal record. Id. If
the record is informal, then there is essentially no factual record to review, and
courts can only review the agency under the arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of dis-
cretion standard. Even if the agency provides a formal record of its findings, how-
ever, courts use the substantial evidence test to review findings of fact, but that
test is equivalent to only a reasonableness standard. See supra notes 97-99 and
accompanying text (explaining that the arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discre-
tion standard and substantial evidence review are essentially reasonableness
tests). In addition, it is impractical for a court of appeals to review findings of fact
because that would essentially require a de novo hearing, which an appellate court
is ill-equipped to provide.
163. After minimizing the judicial review of an agency's findings of law and fact,
the only Crowell element that remains for a court to review is the agency's proce-
dure. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 42.
164. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 106-13
(explaining the limitations on an agency's discretionary choice between adjudica-
tion and rule-making).
165. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining that if a statute spe-
cifically requires the use of a certain type of hearing, then the department must comply).
166. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining the administrative
law standard of review over an agency's selection of hearing).
167. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. In addition, it would be un-
usual for an agency to decide whether to implement a system-wide program by
conducting an adjudicative hearing. If it did, however, then the consistency re-
quirement would be important, but that is unlikely to occur.
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With respect to the decision of which programs to provide to a
group of inmates, the most applicable standard of review is the ar-
bitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion standard. 168 Because cor-
rection officials determine which programs they will provide
throughout an entire department, they are affecting the interests
of many people in a centralized manner. This type of decision is
most similar to a legislative decision, which affects the rights of
several people in an efficient manner.169 Because of the central-
ized nature of the programming decision,170 it is reasonable for a
department of corrections to use a rule-making hearing to make its
decision. Thus, it is unlikely that the hearing selection will be ar-
bitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. However, the admin-
istrative review does not end there.
2. Taking a Hard Look at the Informal Decisions of
Correctional Agencies
For rule-making to be an effective and efficient protector of
constitutional rights, a record of the hearing must be generated in
a formal proceeding. If rule-making is informal, the reviewing
court will "not know the particular or evidential facts ... on which
[an agency] rested its conclusion. Not only are the facts unknown;
there is no way to find them out."'17 1 Because of this, the correc-
168. The substantive statutes grant the corrections administrators broad
authority to establish programs to manage the correctional institutions. See, e.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.206(6)(d) (1994) (authorizing the director of the depart-
ment to announce rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1969
which provide for the "management and control of state penal institutions"); see
supra note 84 and accompanying text (describing the broad statutory power of cor-
rectional agencies to pursue their policy preferences).
169. See supra notes 108-11 (explaining the required procedures for an adminis-
trative rule-making proceeding). In comparison, an adjudicative hearing is less
efficient in that it allows individual testimony and the presentation of evidence.
See supra notes 107, 111. Additionally, even though female inmates are a small
percentage of the prison population, if each female inmate challenged the dis-
criminatory policy at her respective institution, the number of adjudications would
debilitate the correctional system. See supra note 57 (reporting that in 1992 there
were more than 50,000 women in correctional institutions nationally). Thus, even
though adjudicative hearings provide more protection of individual rights, it is im-
practical to use them for centralized administrative decisions.
170. This is notably different from a decision regarding whether an individual
inmate should be granted access to a program that the department provides.
171. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937). When
information is "copied in the findings without preliminary proof, there is at least
an opportunity in connection with a judicial review of the decision to challenge the
deductions made from them." Id. at 302-03. In comparison, however, informal
rule-making excludes meaningful opportunity for judicial review of the decision.
Id.; see also supra notes 95-99 (explaining that the lack of a record in informal de-
cisions forces courts to review the agency action using only the arbitrary, capri-
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tional system should balance its governmental interest in effi-
ciency, and thus in rule-making, against the interests of the indi-
vidual by providing a formal record of each proceeding. 72 In the
alternative, the legislature should increase the requirements of
rule-making by creating a statutory mandate that the department
of corrections must follow formal procedures if it chooses to use a
rule-making procedure. 173
Within the current system's structure, however, courts
should review the informal procedures of the agency using the
tools of administrative law. While the federal and state adminis-
trative procedure acts only require a department of corrections to
follow notice and comment procedures when using informal rule-
making, 74 the substantive statute, the judicial common law of
administrative decision-making and the Constitution also present
restrictions on the procedures and substantive determinations of
the prison officials. 175 Of these restraints, the standards under the
administrative procedure acts and the judicial common law re-
straints are the most effective. 176
cious, or abuse of discretion standard).
172. One way to implement the change to formal proceedings is to have formal,
written policies to guide the decisions of the agency. This would provide objective
criteria for the agency to follow and a thorough record for courts to examine when
reviewing an agency decision. As an example, the Fairfax County Jail in Virginia
has a formal, written policy for an Institutional Classification Committee to follow
when classifying inmates to different custody levels. Morris et al., supra note 68,
at 12. The "objective behavioral classification principles" applies to all inmates.
Id. This results in the classification of inmates based on their behaviors and abili-
ties rather than on factors that could result in a negative stereotype, such as a
being mentally ill or addicted to drugs. Id.
173. Only a legislature may impose procedural requirements on an agency con-
ducting a rule-making hearing. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978); see also supra
note 111 and accompanying text (discussing statutory procedural requirements
and the inability of courts to impose additional rule-making requirements). A
statute can only require an agency to use formal procedures by clearly requiring it.
See United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); see also supra
text accompanying note 106 (explaining this rule in the context of a procedural re-
view of an agency's action).
174. See supra notes 95, 108.
175. See supra notes 92-115 and accompanying text.
176. Substantive statutes generally grant broad powers to departments of cor-
rections. See supra note 84 (using provisions from the Michigan statute as an ex-
ample of a broad delegation of power). Additionally, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment only requires prison officials to follow procedures that
provide minimum fairness to protect against arbitrary government decisions. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (holding that prisoners are entitled to
minimum due process under the Constitution); see also supra notes 113-14 and
accompanying text (describing the procedural protection the Due Process Clause
provides to individuals against arbitrary agency procedures).
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The administrative procedure acts review informal rule-
making hearings with the arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discre-
tion standard. 177 While this standard is essentially a reasonable-
ness test,178 it is not passive. One factor courts look for in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a regulation is whether the decision
is consistent with past agency policies.179 In the context of a de-
partment of corrections, the decision to provide a given program to
some inmates but not to others presents the problem of an incon-
sistent agency policy regarding the value of a program to the goals
of the department. 8 0 When there is an inconsistent agency policy,
the reviewing court should take a "hard look" at the agency's deci-
sion. 1 1 However, when the department of corrections follows an
informal process, there will be an insufficient record for the court
to conduct a hard look review, 182 and the court would remand the
case to the agency to explain its decision.' 8 3 After the department
explains its action on remand, the court ensures that the reason is not
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Presumably, a depart-
ment would offer an administrative convenience, security or economic
rationale, 8 4 which the court would likely deem to be reasonable."85
In this way, the arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion
standard, coupled with hard look review, serves as a check on the
department's discretion by ensuring that it had a permissible rea-
son for its action. By requiring a department of corrections to pro-
177. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting the applicability of this
standard in an informal proceeding).
178. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (comparing the arbitrary, capri-
cious or abuse of discretion standard to rational basis review).
179. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (explaining that courts apply
a hard look review if an agency decision is inconsistent with its own past policies).
180. See, e.g., Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (reviewing
inconsistencies in the provision of programs within the Michigan prison system);
cf., e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (reviewing inconsistent policies in the automobile insurance industry).
181. See supra notes 101-02. Under a hard look review, a court examines the
agency's decision to find an explanation for the inconsistent policy.
182. See supra notes 95-98 (explaining that informal procedures do not require
agency explanations to be on the record).
183. See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 30 (remanding for an explanation of an
agency decision because the informal process did not provide a record that ex-
plained a change in agency policy).
184. See, e.g., Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1085 (using an economic argument to try
to justify discrepancies between prison programming for male and female in-
mates). See generally supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing this eco-
nomic argument and explaining the rationale behind it).
185. While these arguments are not sufficient to survive intermediate scrutiny,
see supra note 77, they are sufficient under a reasonableness test because they are
not completely arbitrary. See supra note 75.
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vide an explanation, the court pushes the prison administration
toward the formal procedures, even though it occurs after the ini-
tial agency hearing. Additionally, if courts remand cases fre-
quently enough under hard look review, correctional agencies may
find the informal method to be inefficient in the long run and move
toward formal proceedings at the initial hearing. Thus, the review
of agency procedures provides an effective manner for courts to re-
view agency decisions.
3. Refocusing Review of Constitutional Rights Through
the Eyes of Administrative Law
While administrative law provides for the review of both
statutory and constitutional rights, constitutional rights should be
the final focus in judicial review of a corrections department. This
is true because of the nature of the applicable laws. Statutes usu-
ally directly address the powers of a department of corrections 8 6
whereas the Constitution focuses on the rights of inmates. 187
Thus, the Constitution provides a more general protection for in-
mates and serves as a final check on the discretion of a corrections
department.
With respect to prison programming, the Equal Protection
Clause can apply in two different ways. First, it can attempt to
ensure the substantive fairness in the provision of programs. 188
However, as current case law exemplifies, this approach has not
been effective. 189 Second, the Equal Protection Clause can apply to
the procedures the agency uses to make the program decisions for
male and female inmates. Using equal protection this way would
overcome the problems encountered when it is used to review the
substantive results of the programming decisions. Specifically, be-
186. See, e.g., supra note 84 (identifying sections of the Michigan code that
grant power to the state department of corrections).
187. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (protecting individual rights).
188. See supra note 15 (identifying cases in which inmates invoked the Equal
Protection Clause in this manner).
189. To avoid the constitutional problem, many courts hold that male and fe-
male inmates are not similarly situated. See supra note 153 and accompanying
text (explaining that courts avoid the full constitutional issue by holding that male
and female inmates are not similarly situated); see, e.g., Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F.
Supp 1243 (S.D. Iowa 1995). Others apply rational basis review without realizing
that under administrative law norms this standard should be reserved for re-
viewing the agency's discretion with respect to procedures and hearings. See, e.g.,
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1987) (upholding a prison regulation under
rational basis review when inmates challenged it on constitutional grounds). Fi-
nally, as in Glover v. Johnson, a court conducts constitutional review to hold that
the programs violate equal protection, but they fail to find an effective remedy.
See, e.g., Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
1997]
Law and Inequality
cause male and female inmates are similarly situated with respect
to process, 190 a court would not be able to end the analysis by
holding that they are not similarly situated. 191 The identified dif-
ferences between male and female inmates192 have no bearing on
the procedures that a department uses to make programming deci-
sions. 193 Additionally, when following the norms of administrative
law, the court already used a rational basis standard to review the
agency's procedure,19 4 so it would be illogical to use the same stan-
dard again because it would not provide an additional check on the
agency's discretion. Because procedural decisions, such as whether
to evaluate the needs of inmates, do not impact the institutional
security or daily prison operations, courts should not defer to a de-
partment's discretion by applying rational basis review. 195
Thus, the final dimension of administrative judicial review
should focus on constitutional rights and apply intermediate scru-
tiny' 96 to review the process correctional departments use when
making programming decisions that infringe upon the equal rights
of female inmates. When departments use different procedures
with respect to male and female inmates, the process will fail
equal protection review because proffered justifications, such as
administrative convenience or financial constraints, do not sub-
stantially further an important governmental interest.197 If the
court finds a constitutional violation when applying equal protec-
tion review to a gender discrimination claim challenging an
agency's process, the court will be able to identify the first stage of
the administrative process that creates the constitutional problem
and will implement a remedy at that point in the agency's process.
190. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 733 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994).
191. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
192. See supra Part I.B.
193. For example, the fact that women commit more economic crimes than men
or that female inmates have more family obligations than male inmates is not re-
lated to a department's decision to use an informal process or to distribute a ques-
tionnaire to inmates to study their needs.
194. See supra notes 99 and accompanying text (comparing the arbitrary, capri-
cious or abuse of discretion standard to rational basis review); supra Part III.B.2
(applying the arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion standard to agency proce-
dures and decisions).
195. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (encouraging deference to the discretion of
prison administrators to avoid jeopardizing institutional security and infringing on
the daily operation of the prison).
196. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (explaining that gender dis-
crimination claims warrant intermediate scrutiny, which requires any difference in
the procedures that a department follows for making decisions regarding male and
female inmates must be substantially related to an important government interest).
197. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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In contrast, current judicial review attempts to impose a final solu-
tion without remedying the underlying defective process. 198 By re-
viewing the underlying process, judicial review of correctional
agencies will lead to a permanent solution by addressing the heart
of the problem.
If courts acknowledge and properly utilize principles of ad-
ministrative law to refocus the constitutional review of inmate
challenges against prison programming, they will be able to limit
agency discretion and protect the rights of inmates. The adminis-
trative tools authorize courts to review the rule-making hearings
of departments' 99 and to lead the agencies toward a formal process
by requiring them to explain any inconsistencies in programming
decisions. 200 Additionally, courts should more clearly review the
constitutional rights at issue by applying intermediate scrutiny to
rights of inmates under the Equal Protection Clause.
Type of Informal
Procedure Formal




Figure 4. Type of Hearing
Glover v. Johnson illustrates that finding an effective remedy
is just as important as identifying the constitutional problem it-
self.20 1 If the Glover court had acknowledged the principles of ad-
198. See, e.g., Glover v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 808, 851-52 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(ordering Michigan's Huron Valley Women's Facility to follow a remedial plan to
correct a disparate provision of services).
199. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text (explaining the authority of
courts to review agency procedures and describing the procedural requirements for
agency actions).
200. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (describing the hard look
doctrine as a tool of administrative law that courts use to require agencies to ex-
plain inconsistencies in policy).
201. See Glover v. Johnson, 879 F. Supp. 752, 753-54 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding
that the department of corrections was not in compliance with a remedy that the
court ordered more than fifteen years earlier).
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ministrative law, it might have achieved a solution to the uncon-
stitutional programming problem at the Huron Valley Women's
Facility with more ease and efficiency. As it was, the Glover court
encroached on the administration's authority by reviewing the
wisdom of the correctional programs 202 and ordering specific pro-
cedural requirements for the department to follow. 2°3 Further-
more, the court focused on the substantive state statutes that
granted power to the Michigan Department of Corrections, 20 4 but
it did not look at the restrictions imposed on the Department by
the state APA. If the Glover court had adhered to the principles of
administrative law, it still could have ruled that the Department
was violating the constitutional rights of female inmates, but it
could have also ordered a practical remedy that respected the dis-
cretionary authority of the corrections department. This would
have enabled the Department to implement a remedy within the
fiscal and security restraints of the system.205
Conclusion
Courts have found the gender disparities within the correc-
tional system to be unconstitutional in light of the characteristics
202. See, e.g., Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1093 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(deciding that the "work pass program is a desirable program"). However, admin-
istrative law does not ask courts to question the wisdom or propriety of an agency's
decision. See supra note 84 (stating that courts do not substitute their judgment
for that of an agency with respect to the wisdom or propriety of a decision). Es-
tablishing policies is a primary purpose of administrative agencies, see LOEVINGER,
supra note 83, at 10, and courts undermine that purpose by examining the wisdom
of various policy options.
203. Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1102-03. The remedy ordered by the court was very
specific in that it required the department to provide specific courses for female
inmates, to assess their needs and interests with a specific survey, and to imple-
ment apprenticeship programs in conjunction with vocational programs. Id. How-
ever, administrative law bars courts from imposing procedural requirements be-
yond those of the administrative procedure acts on an agency conducting a rule-
making hearing. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978); see supra note 111 (identifying the
procedural requirements imposed on agencies by administrative procedure acts
and indicating that courts do not have the authority to impose additional proce-
dural requirements on agencies). This is an important element of administrative
review because it grants the correctional administrators the discretion they need
to run the prisons while enabling the court to restrict the degree of the discretion.
204. See Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1081.
205. "There must be a 'mutual accommodation between institutional needs and
objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."'
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
556 (1974)). Security is the primary concern of prisons and demands the majority
of available funding, and prison programming operates around the needs of secu-
rity. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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and demographics of male and female inmate populations. This
shows that the written law will protect the rights of female in-
mates while they are in the correctional system. However, despite
this protection from the law itself, female inmates continue to suf-
fer from inadequate and unequal facilities and services in com-
parison to those provided to their male counterparts. The absence
of a remedy in light of de facto protection not only feeds on the
modern weakness of the law, but it also suggests there is another
problem in the system.
The law was meant to function as a tool for identifying prob-
lems and solving them in a fair and determinative manner. The
modern weakness in the legal system is that the law has become a
tool for those who only identify problems in society but who do not
work to solve them. It is an insult to the power and the purpose of
the law for courts and citizens to point to societal problems and
then to propose remedies that are so vague that they are impossi-
ble to apply. The fact that unfair and indeterminate holdings are
plaguing the correctional system today with respect to the treat-
ment of female inmates serves as further evidence that the written
law cannot achieve its full potential without assistance.
In essence, the inconsistent and ineffective decisions of the
courts reveal an underlying bias in the legal system. If the law is
to achieve its maximum societal impact and actually resolve prob-
lems, it needs the assistance of an unbiased process. For this to
occur in the penal context, the judicial system needs to start ex-
amining the decision-making process within the correctional sys-
tem as it would the decisions of any other administrative agency.
This type of review will provide steps toward a solution, albeit a
slow one, to the gender disparities within the system. The deci-
sions holding that unequal services for male and female inmates
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause were based on the de-
termination that male and female inmates are not similarly situ-
ated. This conclusion is not convincing, and it actually exposes the
discrimination permeating the corrections system. By eliminating
the dispute regarding whether male and female inmates are simi-
larly situated and by turning the attention of the judiciary to the
procedures leading up to the final determinations of the correc-
tional agencies, suits brought under the Constitution and adminis-
trative procedure acts will make it more difficult for bias to affect
agency decisions.
There is a problem with the women's correctional system,
which is to say there is a problem with the correctional system
overall. Unfortunately, the problem is not that isolated. It extends
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into the judiciary and into society itself. Stereotypes of females
still permeate the societal undercurrent. Because the booming
female inmate population is still a relatively new phenomenon, the
correctional system is still in its formative stages of learning how
to respond. This historical moment provides the optimal, and in-
deed the only, opportunity to ensure that future female inmates
will receive fair and equal treatment. Achieving this equal treat-
ment will be a long process, but in order to actually use the power
of the law to achieve equality, courts must begin to examine the
process itself.
